Post #14: David Pearce’s consciousness proposal

I received a direct message from David explaining his consciousness theory. I’ve explored a couple links beyond that and might now have gained a reasonable understanding of his position. I’m going to try describing the proposal in my own words to display the extent to which I do and don’t understand it. From there he can correct me about anything that seems off. I’ll also go through some points he’s presented regarding valid consciousness proposals in general. This should further demonstrate my understanding or lack thereof. I’ll leave Johnjoe’s proposal alone for now, that is except for a couple specific questions David left at the end. In the grand scheme of things I don’t think we’re truly that far apart, and even though the theory’s themselves are certainly different. They each seek a prize where the winner should earn eternal fame, though all else should become irrelevant footnotes at the long overdue closing of a very sad chapter.

In general I’m going to use the word “sentience” rather than “consciousness” here.  In modern English I think he’ll appreciate this term to be a bit more fundamental and not quite as bastardized.  I haven’t yet gotten into the “innocent/wonderful” consciousness definition in my blog that I prefer from Eric Schwitzgebel.  But maybe going with “sentience” for now will at least help?  Furthermore David’s ethics movement is directly about the sentience of our planet’s life, which is to say the unique element of value regarding all existence.  We’re quite aligned on that point. 

From what I can tell his position begins with the micro sentience of all elements of reality individually, though in an irrelevant way since any given example will be incredibly minuscule.  Here we might as well consider things in general to not be sentient even if they technically are.  What this effectively does is give him an ability to exchange a “hard” problem for a “combination” problem. 

Regardless he proposes that quantum coherence lets brain based dynamics bind countless otherwise individual sentiences, and even though each one will merely exist for sub-femtoseconds.  Thus with such binding even human level sentience may be possible.  Theoretically here the brain has evolved instruments to punish and reward this quantum bound experiencer so that the brain can follow that experiencer’s desires and thus promote genetic proliferation. 

Even though quick decoherence in a given instance will end any specific “sentience frame”, I presume that sentience must effectively continue by means of massive replacement sub-femtosecond quantum coherences.  Together they should constitute a given macro sentience. 

One question would be how might brains do so while presumably the quantum function of a standard rock does not?  Is a specific brain mechanism proposed (like neurons doing quantum stuff) or is one simply presumed?  I do see something about the equations of quantum field theory being the means of brain to quantum field interaction.  Also when scientists create quantum coherence in substantial ways, should associated binding/sentience occur here?  In that case I suppose it would be “locked in” sentience without a means to act. 

The following would be what David mentioned as five components for more solid sentience theories: 

The first is to answer the hard problem of sentience.  As mentioned earlier he gets past this by positing that everything has minuscule sentence that doesn’t really matter, though once combined by means of sub-femtosecond quantum coherence in the brain, macro sentience can exist. 

I propose an amendment to the standard “hard problem of sentience” perspective however.  Observe that there once was a hard problem of gravity, and it hasn’t entirely been solved.  This is to say that Newton admittedly couldn’t tell us why mass would attract mass.  Nevertheless he did contribute tremendously to physics by positing the nature of the attraction.  Later Einstein helped a bit more by observing that mass bends spacetime.  My point is that neither of them needed to directly tell us why physics function as it functions, but rather needed to effectively model how it functions.  So maybe we should attempt to do the same for the hard problem of sentience?  As David mentioned in his original video here, “Philosophy’s cheap”.  Thus each of us I are interested in falsifiable descriptions. 

His second observation was the phenomenal binding problem of sentience.  Yes it does make sense to me that quantum “coherence” might bind individual sentiences into a singular macro sentience.  Furthermore quantum decoherence should thus explain unbinding. 

For the third condition, instead of base sentience I’ll step up to the full “consciousness” term. This would be the problem of its causal functional efficiency. I presume consciousness came to work as well as it has by means of evolution. Whatever constitutes consciousness, it’s become an effective sort of tool. Such binding brings the potential for more than just “bits”, but rather “understandings”. Is David’s proposal appropriate for the engineering of evolution? Apparently he proposes brain dynamics that sequentially interact with sub-femtosecond quantum dynamics given the equations of quantum field theory. So when things don’t work as well as they might, here it ought to be possible for evolution to find workarounds. If things were to go well for his proposal then details should be discovered.

Fourth is the pallet problem.  Could quantum fields have enough diversity to account for the diversity of consciousness itself?  I don’t know what could be more diverse than that, so no worries there. 

Fifth is to have novel and precise experimental predictions that sensible people agree would validate or refute a theory.  Does he have this?  He’s certainly trying.  David’s proposal is found here.  https://www.physicalism.com/abstract.html

What it’s set up to counter is the reductio ad absurdum stigma of quantum mind on the basis of the great heat and mass of standard brain function. Apparently phenomenal binding is thought to consist of quantum-coherent superpositions of neurons at sub-femtosecond timescales. So he says it’s like a movie at 1015 quantum-coherent frames per second. But if we were to hook up an in vitro neural network (repurposed brain stuff I suppose) to appropriate input and output devices, then we’d monitor this sort of function to see if there were any non-classical interference patterns set up. He predicts that if done well enough then we’d find non-noise sub-femtosecond macro superpositions that suggest perceptual object recognition.

I’ll leave things here for questions and comments. We’ll see what corrections he has when he lets me know. Furthermore if/when this gets settled then I’d like him to try describing Johnjoe’s consciousness model. I may need to do more explaining though. As a preview for what’s hopefully to come, here are some questions of his that I’ll provide short answers to:

– – – – –

EM theories?

It’s not clear to me how they solve or dissolve the Hard Problem. How and why do supposedly non-experiential fermionic fields generate a particular bosonic field of experience? Are all electromagnetic fields experiential – including e.g. low-level microwave radiation permeates space? Or just some of them?

– – – – – –

Johnjoe approaches this problem just as Newton approached non-explained gravity. Perhaps the physics of an EM field around the parameters of standard synchronous neuron firing, exists as sentience in itself. So here the light that enters the eye goes on to cause an EM field which itself constitutes an experiencer of all elements of what’s seen. Of course this is all open to empirical testing, though I suspect it to be found that sentience doesn’t stray too far from the sorts of EM field parameters produced by the synchronous neuron firing of life on Earth.

Cheers David, and readers in general!

– – – – – – –

Update 7:13 am December 5, 2023

For some reason David’s message on from Twitter wouldn’t paste last night, but here it is:

Thanks again
ah….no, not _non-existent, rather phenomenally unbound. When you are anaesthetised or dreamlessly asleep, is your consciousness extinguished as we commonly suppose? Or merely phenomenally unbound?
Anyhow…..


Any adequate theory of consciousness must – at a minimum – solve the (1) the Hard Problem AND (2) the phenomenal binding problem AND (3) the problem of the causal-functional efficacy of consciousness AND (4) the palette problem (i.e. how can the extraordinarily rich diversity of conscious experience be derived from the relatively homogeneous neuronal constituents of the brain?). AND, at a minimum, the theory must generate novel, precise, experimentally falsifiable predictions that proponents AND critics alike agree will (dis)confirm the theory.
These requirements are fairly non-trivial.

By transposing the entire mathematical apparatus of modern physics onto an experiential ontology, non-materialist physicalism (cf. https:///www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#nonmat)
offers answers to 1 to 4 above.
Thus there is no “Hard Problem” because only the physical is real: the intrinsic nature of the world’s fundamental quantum fields – the essence of the physical – is experiential. And the phenomenally-bound macroscopic worlds of everyday experience (“perception”) characteristic of animal minds are underpinned by individual “cat states” / superpositions of neuronal feature processors; the medium or vehicle of representation is quantum; their subjective content is classical. Only the physical has causal efficacy; thus physical consciousness can talk and think about its own existence. And the solutions to the equations of QFT encode the precise textures and interrelationships of qualia.


The distinction between (constitutive) panpsychism and non-materialist physicalism may sound pedantic. The two frameworks have obvious affinities. But panpsychism is a form of property dualism – with all the challenges that any kind of dualism involves. By contrast, non-materialist physicalism is monist to the core. Only physical properties are real; and they are encoded in the mathematical formalism of QFT.


EM theories?
It’s not clear to me how they solve or dissolve the Hard Problem. How and why do supposedly non-experiential fermionic fields generate a particular bosonic field of experience? Are all electromagnetic fields experiential – including e.g. low-level microwave radiation permeates space? Or just some of them?

27 thoughts on “Post #14: David Pearce’s consciousness proposal”

  1. “It’s not clear to me how they solve or dissolve the Hard Problem”

    It’s not clear to me that anything resolves the “hard” problem because it is a manufactured philosophical problem. At any rate, what would it be about quantum coherence that generates experience? There’s no reason there couldn’t be Q-zombies.

    More later.

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  2. “The first is to answer the hard problem of sentience. As mentioned earlier, he gets past this by positing that everything has minuscule sentence that doesn’t really matter, though once combined by means of sub-femtosecond quantum coherence in the brain, macro sentience can exist.”

    This is the predicate concept upon which all of his arguments depend. However, in order to be a viable answer to the hard problem, this predicate concept has to be put under the scrutiny of rigorous synthetic a priori analysis, not a priori analysis alone. As his model currently stands, it is similar in nature to panpsychism where he is effectively trading micro-consciousness for minuscule sentience. This intellectual maneuver, novel as it is does not get around nor defeat the inherent problems built into the panpsychism model.

    His approach to the hard problem is correct, and like it or not, one has to approach the hard problem from this perspective. So I give David a round of applauds.

    David is close, but not quite there yet. If he could nail down a grounding foundational predicate concept as I have done with my model, one that reflects the true nature of reality, his following bullets points will coalesce and everything will fall into place.

    Great job Eric, a round of applauds for bringing David Pearce to your blog. 👍

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    1. Lee,
      Do you see any similarities with “the hard problem of sentience” and what in the post I called “the hard problem of gravity”? My point was that Newton and Einstein didn’t need to understand why physics functions as physics functions, but rather just to effectively model it. So maybe Chalmers screwed everyone over by getting them to believe that they need something to make sense here, when in fact what’s needed is an effective model?

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      1. I do see the similarities and I’m glad you brought it up. And yes, we do not need to know why physics functions as physic functions.

        These models are used to make predictions and they are very effective even though they do not reflect the true nature of reality.

        “So maybe Chalmers screwed everyone over by getting them to believe that they need something to make sense here, when in fact what’s needed is an effective model?”

        That’s an opened ended question Eric, it all depends on what a given individual wants out of mind theory. Gravity is one thing and physics is physics, but consciousness is a little closer to home.

        I guess the greater question is what it will mean if we reach the point that we actually do understand. IMHO, I think a thorough and complete accounting of the hard problems of consciousness, life and matter itself will shine a bright light on our universe and our place within that universe.

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      2. I agree with “the hard problem of gravity” argument. Science can’t deliver final explanations, but neither can any other human cognitive activity though some may believe that religion or philosophy can do it. Ultimately, why there is something, and why is the something like it is, can’t be answered. It is a sort of World Incompleteness Theorem, LOL

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  3. Pearce’s “experiential ontology” and “non-materialist physicalism” remind me very much of Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy. Does he have views on this?

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    1. I can’t exactly say on that but maybe you could help piece this together since you know Whitehead. I think the “experiential ontology” is essentially a way to get past the though that one needs to make sense of how it is that non-qualia can create qualia? If everything is made of qualia then no need for an explanation. Can Whitehead’s process philosophy in any sense be reduced to that?

      As I just mentioned to Lee, I don’t think we should need to explain why qualia would emerge from certain physics. Newton didn’t need to explain why mass would attract mass, and yet he was about as transformative as it gets.

      Then on “non-materialist physicalism”, that may just be a fancy way of rebelling against the sometimes still used “materialist” classification. Fields don’t seem to fit right under the “material” label. I like to call myself a “causalist”.

      Of course if I hear anything I’ll pass it along.

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      1. Yes, that could be one way of describing Whitehead’s thought, although he wouldn’t have used “qualia,” — not just because of the anachronism, but because the word carries a lot of baggage about sensations and properties. In his day, modern physics was overthrowing the conceptions of classic physics, and Whitehead wanted to overthrow much of the classical philosophy from which classical physics had developed. Scorning scientific materialism in a most articulate way, he developed a new (unfortunately rather difficult) vocabulary of “prehension” and “occasions,” and a theory one could aptly describe as “experiential ontology.” That’s why I wanted to know what Pearce made of him, if anything.

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      2. I’ve heard from David and he says this:

        There are some affinities between my views and Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy but I’m a hardcore physicalist (albeit not in the way most materialists would recognise). Also I lean to https://arxiv.org/pdf/1210.8447.pdf
        which is radically different from process philosophy

        So I suspect the similarities are merely coincidental.

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      3. Thanks for following up. Unfortunately , althought the linked paper promises that “Finally (section 6), the relation of the argument to other work in physics and philosophy is discussed,” that section contains no mention of Whitehead’s philosophy as a point of comparison.

        More curiously, the paper concludes with the suggestion that “The double role [of the measurement, as both the fundamental precipitate of detectable reality and an almost inconsequential element of it, or so I would paraphrase] is fundamentally built into science. I conjecture it cannot be resolved within science.” It argues that in the many worlds theory, nothing actually happens at all (in a surprisingly Parmenidean conception of a static sphere, albeit of multiple dimensions), but does not clearly articulate a preference for either of the usual alternatives, Copenhagen or pilot-wave. Are we to understand that this is the position to which Pearce leans?

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  4. I have some question for the QMinders about how this works.

    If a visual information is detected by the eye, assuming it propagates along nerves in some kind of classical manner, at what point in the process does it go quantum?

    How does it transition from electrochemical firing in the incoming nerve to quantum coherence across the entire brain?

    The human visual system process 10 to 12 images per second but the propagation rate from the eye to the brain might be as low as 13 ms. That would suggest we should be able to see individual images at around 70-80 images per second if the Qmind is working in picoseconds. Explain discrepancy and lag.

    What are the uses of the axons and dendrites in the brain if neurons can coher information quantumly? Why is there constant reorganization of connectivity via synapses in a QBrain?

    Explain why this 1000 ms lag:

    “Inhibiting the cells of the superior colliculus made the mice less likely to report that they’d seen an event, and when they did, their decision took longer. The inhibition had to occur within a 100 millisecond (one-tenth of a second) interval after the visual event.”

    https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8914571

    And this 10 ms lag:

    “These repeating connectivity patterns argue for a hierarchical
    organization (as opposed to a parallel or fully interconnected
    organization) of the areas with visual information traveling first
    from the retina to the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus
    (LGN), and then through cortical area V1 to V2 to V4 to IT (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991). Consistent with this, the (mean) first
    visually evoked responses of each successive cortical area are
    successively lagged by 10 ms”

    Click to access S0896-6273(12)00092-X.pdf

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    1. I think you know my answer Jim. As a system, the brain is never conscious. Consciousness is the experience of the cognitive system that is regulated by the brain. It is this “cognitive system” that is quantum cohered during wakefulness.

      Think of this mind/brain relationship as symbiotic by denoting a mutually beneficial relationship between two different systems. Since there are two differently distinct systems, one quantum and one classical, one would expect to find a time lag. Therefore, time lag is a non-problem for a quantum hypothesis.

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      1. Take a stab at my other questions. But this answer makes no sense to me. The science being cited is about specific atomic/molecular behavior in the microtubules. The coherence, if it exists at all, is in physical atoms/molecules/ions, etc. So, for the cognitive system to be on or off requires coherence in the brain. My question was whether this molecular coherence was constant or does it switch on and off on some regular timing.

        Can you also explain why specific deficits in this “cognitive system” would be associated with damage to very specific areas of the brain? For example, loss of color vision can be caused by damage to the ventral medial region of the occipital lobe. Why would the cohered brain/mind be reliant on a specific part of the brain for color? With all those microtubules working and cohering across the whole brain, can’t some fill in the gaps and bring out the color?

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      2. “So, for the cognitive system to be on or off requires coherence in the brain.”

        Right, and for all practical purposes the brain is a unified classical system that is doing its thing as long as the heart pumps blood to it. So, if you are asking whether this molecular coherence within the brain was constant, I think a reasonable answer would be yes.

        Your next question is answered by what I suggested earlier; the mind/brain relationship is symbiotic by denoting a mutually beneficial relationship, good, bad, or indifferent between two different systems. If parts of the brain are damaged one would expect to see this reflected in the cognitive system because of that mutually “inclusive” symbiotic relationship. And likewise, if there is a deficiency in the quantum devices like being anesthetized by a chemical compound one would expect to see that manifest as well resulting in unconsciousness.

        Clear as mud……

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      3. “the brain is a unified classical system”

        It’s classical but, at best, it is loosely unified.

        “reflected in the cognitive system”

        So, basically this quantum mind exactly parallels the actual physical brain. That’s convenient. Why wouldn’t some of the microtubules for hearing fill in for defective ones for vision?. Are there specialized microtubules for vision and hearing?

        How does the quantum mind, symbiotic to the brain, interact with the brain?

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      4. Convenient yes, and quite parsimonious as well. You ask great questions Jim and hopefully, we may be able to answer them some day.

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  5. “Fifth is to have novel and precise experimental predictions that sensible people agree would validate or refute a theory. Does he have this? He’s certainly trying. David’s proposal is found here”.

    I took a look at it.

    Proposal: Phenomenal binding of distributed neuronal feature-processors in the CNS is classically impossible.

    Certainly unproven. But more importantly, there is no real clarity on how tight the binding must be in our consciousness for us to believe consciousness is tightly unified. There are many identified time lags in brain processing. For example, the temporal masking phenomena where the mask follows the target.

    “As the time difference between the target and the mask increases, the masking effect decreases. This is because the integration time of a target stimulus has an upper limit 200 ms, based on physiological experiments[3][4][5] and as the separation approaches this limit, the mask is able to produce less of an effect on the target, as the target has had more time to form a full neural representation in the brain”

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Visual_masking

    If full neural representation requires 200 ms in the brain, the components of the representations would have up to 200 ms to be generated for effective binding to occur. This could allow different pieces to be generated at different places in the brain but still seem to be bound together. The brain is fast enough we simply don’t notice the lags and most of the integration can be accounted for with simple relay messaging.

    Ironically, David writes: “More poetically, our phenomenally bound minds are akin to a movie or virtual reality world-simulation running at around 1015 quantum-coherent frames per second.”

    So at 1015 quantum-coherent frames per second we are missing parts of target images up to 200 ms?

    The simplest answer to the “palette problem” is that the brain has hundreds of microconsciousnesses associated with discrete groups of neurons. Consciousness literally is a palette.

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    1. A palette, right on……… I think substituting a multitude of micro-consciousnesses with a multitude of protoconsciousness building blocks or devices adds clarity.

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      1. In agreement, palette is a great metaphor.

        Proto-consciousness in mind theory is ambiguous like many other terms however, I am using the term to delineate between the quantum devices which once unified and bound give rise to a cognitive system that is conscious.

        I’ve avoided the term in the past, but I think it applies to a quantum device which by itself is not conscious but as a mechanism it has the properties and/or potential to give rise to consciousness.

        muddy, muddy waters……

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  6. The mind/brain problem is plagued by the same analytical dysfunction as the hard problem of gravity, which for all practical purposes is a self-caused cause. To avoid the paradox of a self-caused cause in the case of gravity, mass cannot be the cause of gravity therefore, it has to be something else. What exactly, we do not know.

    And likewise, what the brain does by “theoretically” processing information cannot be the cause of what we refer to as mind because that would also be a self-caused cause. But here we are free to utilize synthetic a priori judgements by positing a “condition” on a possibility to see if that possibility stands up under the scrutiny of synthetic a priori analysis. And in this scenario, the “condition on a possibility” is that mind is a separate and distinct cognitive system regulated by the brain. A cognitive system that for all practical purposes is in a mutually inclusive, as well as mutually beneficial symbolic relationship with the brain.

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  7. Here’s I think may be the biggest problem of all with quantum mind.

    For a quantum state to have an causal power, it would have to decoher when it interacted with the brain. So, the brain would have to be starting a quantum mind, then stopped it, then starting it, etc.

    So, Eric, I think you are correct when you write “that sentience must effectively continue by means of massive replacement sub-femtosecond quantum coherences”

    But if the quantum mind is generated by the classical brain how does it classically coordinate picosecond coherences and decoherences?

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    1. “…the brain would have to be starting a quantum mind, then stopped it, then starting it, etc.”

      Not necessarily. A cognitive system would operate within the intrinsic boundaries that define the system just like the immune system or any other system that make up our biology. And I agree that in order for a quantum mind to have causal power over a classical system like the brain it would have to decohere. And I think this is exactly what we experience when reasoning.

      While reasoning and not taking action, the cognitive system can hold all possible outcomes in a superposition until an intellectual measurement is made, which then collapses all of the possible outcomes into a single, discrete outcome, an outcome that can then be used to take action either mentally or physically.

      Stuart Kauffman’s theory of mind addresses the dynamics of coherence and decoherence the best.
      His model is called a “poised state”. It’s very similar to how I envision it.

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      1. Poised state or not I understand your model does envision that the state is generated by a classical brain. So, the classical brain would need to be involved in recohering the quantum state after every decoherence.

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      2. Just an FYI; I parsed through some of the links that Pearce provided for Eric. In a nutshell, Pearce has married a version of idealism with physicalism. His entire premise is based upon the wave function being a universal quantum field of consciousness.

        At least it’s innovative…….

        “…the classical brain would need to be involved in recohering the quantum state after every decoherence.”

        To the same degree that the brain is involved in what the autonomous immune system does. If there is indeed an autonomous cognitive system that is quantum, I would think decoherence and recoherence would be a function of the cognitive system just as the functions of the immune system are a feature of the immune system.

        The brain is not up in our heads calling the shots, processing information and directing what the immune system should or should not do.

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