In the last post I provided a video of David Pearce discussing the binding problem of consciousness. It was maybe nine years ago and all he could come up with then was that this binding might be by means of quantum mechanics. So I wondered if he’d given any thought to Johnjoe McFadden’s classical EM field solution? I’ve now heard back from David and he’s provided an extensive enough response to deserve a post of its own. Oh how I’d love for McFadden himself to weigh in! Mind you that I’m referring to a central founder of the quantum biology field itself, a man who actively graduates quantum biology doctorates at Surrey University! I’ll see what I can do about that. Here’s our dialogue so far:
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Hello David.
In a new blog post I’ve included a binding problem video from you. https://cemifanpage.wordpress.com/2023/11/25/post-9-the-neural-binding-problem-of-consciousness/
I wonder if you’ve thought about Surrey professor Johnjoe McFadden’s potential answer that consciousness is bound because it exists as a unified EM field caused by synchronous neuron firing? We’d love to hear from you!
Eric
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Hi Eric
Thank you. I tried to reply but didn’t succeed! Here’s what I tried to post
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Phenomenal binding is classically impossible. A pack of c. 86 billion decohered neurons would just be an aggregate of Jamesian “mind dust”. So how do biological minds accomplish both local and global binding – for example, the phenomenally bound objects populating your everyday world-simulation right now?
Let’s here assume the unitary-only Schrödinger dynamics (rather than some form of “dynamical collapse” theory. If the effective lifetime of neuronal superpositions (neuronal edge-detectors, motion-detectors, colour-mediating neurons and so forth were milliseconds, then such “cat states” would be the obvious candidate for a perfect structural match between our minds and the underlying physics. Superpositions are _individual _ states, not classical aggregates. Synchrony is really superposition. In reality, of course such timescales are fantasy. Decoherence means the effective lifetime of neuronal superpositions in the “warm, wet and noisy” CNS must be at most femtoseconds, maybe attoseconds or less. So It’s just noise!
Or is it?
See:
https://www.hedweb.com/quora/2015.html#quantummind
I explore the quantum-theoretic version of the so-called intrinsic nature argument. Only the physical is real. The physical is exhaustively described by the mathematical formalism of QFT or its speculative generalization. But the intrinsic nature of the physical – the mysterious “fire” in the equations – is no different inside and outside your head. Phenomenal binding, not consciousness per se, is what makes organic minds special.
By contrast, if the intrinsic nature of the physical is _non_experiential, and instead consciousness consists of a single bosonic field, then the EM theorist must explain how a non-experiential electroweak interaction “splits” to give rise to experiential electromagnetic interactions and non-experiential weak interactions. I don’t see how a derivation is possible. If it’s not, then we’re back to dualism / spooky “strong” emergence. Also, I don’t see how EM theories (i.e. theories that discount fermionic consciousness) can account for the dynamic stability of our minds and the phenomenal world-simulations we run. Further, I fear any serious account of mind will be couched within the framework of
https://iai.tv/articles/reality-is-just-a-quantum-wave-function-auid-2024
For expository convenience, I omit technical details.
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I’m grateful to David for this. I’ll leave things here for the moment to email McFadden to see if he has the time to provide us with a response. If so then I’ll update this post with that response when he does. In the meantime we can talk amongst ourselves to potentially make sense of this…
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Update November 27, 2023
Johnjoe McFadden did get me a very timely response. But first I’d like to say that my original question to David Pearce was whether or not he’d ever thought about McFadden’s potential solution? He didn’t quite provide a “yes” or “no” answer, but rather one that began with “Phenomenal binding is classically impossible…”. I can’t be sure but this does suggest that he hasn’t thought about McFadden’s potential solution. If so then he might not be arguing from an informed position on the matter. In that case if he were to learn about the proposal, would his answer change? I wanted to first say that in case there could be agreement here. I mean for effective solutions to be found rather for fights to be waged.
Also David has mentioned that he’ll be focused on a conference for a while, though does seem excited about this discussion!
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Hi Eric
I must admit that I don’t understand David Pearce’s theory but must confess that I haven’t studied it thoroughly. In response to his points:
By contrast, if the intrinsic nature of the physical is _non_experiential, and instead consciousness consists of a single bosonic field, then the EM theorist must explain how a non-experiential electroweak interaction “splits” to give rise to experiential electromagnetic interactions and non-experiential weak interactions.
Response: I don’t understand why we need an electroweak interaction here. The EM force and weak nuclear force are unified only at extraordinarily high energies so, at physiological energies, we have only the EM force and separate nuclear weak and strong forces to deal with. The weak and strong nuclear forces are short range so confined to the nucleus so do not contribute to chemical reactions/neurophysiology of the brain. Also, they cannot be the substrate for binding since they do not share information with even adjacent atoms, never mind neurons across the brain. So, in the cemi field theory, there is no non-experiential electroweak interaction in the brain, only the experienced EM field that mediates the interactions between the brain’s fermions such as its electrons and protons. Being confined to individual nuclei, the nuclear forces cannot be the substrate for binding neuronal information encodes right across the brain. In contrast, the EM forces are entirely delocalized and (being fermions) overlapping so that an immense quantity of information can be ‘bound’ at a single point. In the cemi field theory, there are the substrate for experienced binding.
I don’t see how a derivation is possible. If it’s not, then we’re back to dualism / spooky “strong” emergence.
Response: There’s no spookiness or emergence just experience/binding in that component of the brain’s EM field that is the substrate for (reportable) conscious information. Experience has to be ‘reportable’ in the sense that we can talk about it. So, to be reportably conscious, EMF information must be strong enough to influence neuronal firing. EMF fluctuations coming from few synchronous neurons or large numbers of asynchronously-firing neurons that are too weak to perturb neuron firing will also be components of the nonconscious brain. Nothing spooky, nothing mysteriously emerging, just physical forces.
Also, I don’t see how EM theories (i.e. theories that discount fermionic consciousness) can account for the dynamic stability of our minds and the phenomenal world-simulations we run.
Response: See, the recent studies re’ “representational drift” the phenomenon that the exact neurons maintaining a given memory in working memory actually varies from trial to trial = representational drift. It is clearly difficult to account for representational drift in any neuronal-based theory of working memory but studies by Pinotsis and Miller reveal that, although the neurons encoding a memory change from trial to trial, stability of working memory emerges at the level of the brain’s electric fields, as detected by EEG. In their 2023 paper, the author’s go on to propose that ‘electric fields sculpt neural activity and “tune” the brain’s infrastructure’. So “dynamic stability” is maintained by the brain’s EM fields, not its neurons!
Pinotsis DA, Miller EK. Beyond dimension reduction: Stable electric fields emerge from and allow representational drift. NeuroImage. 2022:119058.
Pinotsis DA, Fridman G, Miller EK. Cytoelectric Coupling: Electric fields sculpt neural activity and “tune” the brain’s infrastructure. Progress in Neurobiology. 2023:102465.
Rule ME, O’Leary T, Harvey CD. Causes and consequences of representational drift. Current opinion in neurobiology. 2019;58:141-7.
This phenomenon has similarities with Mike Levin and Wendy Beane’s work showing that the stability of developmental patterning in, eg. limb formation, is encoded, not in the matter of the body and limbs, but in their electric fields.
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I hope that’s all clear?
Best wishes
Johnjoe
Consciousness as an Electromagnetic Field 
“Phenomenal binding is classically impossible”
Yep, that’s my conclusion too. What’s more there is no evidence of NCC in the brain where everything comes together nor does it seem likely there ever could be for any organism that needed to react to the environment in a timely manner. But I think that just simply means that consciousness isn’t unified but it appears to be for reasons I enumerated in my post on fragmented consciousness.
“By contrast, if the intrinsic nature of the physical is _non_experiential, and instead consciousness consists of a single bosonic field, then the EM theorist must explain how a non-experiential electroweak interaction “splits” to give rise to experiential electromagnetic interactions and non-experiential weak interactions”.
I don’t have a clue to what that means. Nor do I see any requirement that consciousness be a “single bosonic field” for the theory to be viable.
We know EM fields are in the brain. We know when electrons/ions flow an EM field is produced and flowing ions are the source of EM in the brain.
The difference between experiential EM and non-experiential EM isn’t really difficult to explain either. Experiential EM is produced by the brain and can affect the brain because it is in the brain and operates at a strength and frequency where it can affect the brain. Aside from that, compare by analogy sound from a white noise generator with sound from an orchestra playing Beethoven’s Ninth. Both consist of sounds waves. Yet clearly the information content of waves is different in the two cases. Beethoven’s Ninth is structured and organized sound that carries information. Noise is random and unstructured. Non-experiential EM is like white noise. Consciousness is like the symphony. EM in the brain derives its information from the operation of the brain and carries information about the world.
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Phenomenal binding is classically impossible therefore, if one wants to play in the classical playground of physics, exotic schemas have to be developed to overcome the untenable premise that mind is simply what the brain does.
In a previous post, you stated that the fragmented consciousness theory is “not exactly” asserting that mind is simply what the mind does. Upon further examination of Zeki’s model, that is the very foundation upon which the fragmented consciousness theory is built.
Furthermore, to avoid the untenability of classical binding Zeki resorts to a deflated form of illusionism, asserting that this fragmentation gives us the “illusion” that the psyche along with the experience is unified when in fact, it is not.
Asserting that the quantum mind hypothesis goes beyond a quantum foundation is not to understand the premise. Penrose’s gravity model is shear speculation on his part and he readily admits that it is. Regardless of any wackiness that theorist introduce to quantum mind theory, the premise is sound because it provides a physics venue for phenomenal binding, organization, imagination and creativity.
Personally, I do not understand the aversion that so many people share for a quantum mind theory. Until next time…..
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“Upon further examination of Zeki’s model, that is the very foundation upon which the fragmented consciousness theory is built.”
Something to keep in mind. I wrote about fragmented consciousness before reading Zeki. So these ideas are mostly my own, but they generally agree with Zeki’s. I came at it from a different angle. My conclusion came not from any particular piece of research but from many observations and a preference for simplicity in explanations.
1- NCC from the major theories looking for them in particular places in the brain have not been found. See the recent competition on that for the latest confirmation.
2- The NCC, hence, must not be in a single location but are all over the brains in parts.
3- The contents of consciousness and their NCC are located together in the anatomical part of the brain that decades of research have linked them. Visual NCC in the visual cortex, auditory NCC in the auditory cortex, space mapping in the hippocampus, etc. Of course, some behaviors like speech have multiple linked areas because it consists of multiple capabilities.
4- There is no evidence of a field or mystery coherence that could tightly unify consciousness that is fragmented, because of the size of brain and its anatomical features.
5- Consciousness must be loosely unified and any perception of a tightly unified consciousness must be illusory The illusion could be produced by various means including: relatively quick unconscious communication between brain areas, specialized brain areas that provide a sense of self, and larger scale synchronous brain oscillations.
6- Consciousness is local, at the microlevel, where it is able to modify synaptic organization required for learning.
7- The exact mechanism of consciousness is still to be determined, but at the local level many options are possible: quantum entanglement, electromagnetic field modulation, possibly even mechanical action.
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Bullet point four (4) is a straw-man argument because the strongest evidence of a tightly unified consciousness is our own experience.
If I was convinced that mind is not a semi-autonomous cognitive system with causal power that is regulated by the brain just like the immune system is a semi-autonomous system that is regulated by the brain, then I would default to dualism.
The reductionist approach that mind is simply what the brain does, not matter what schema is devised to support this premise reduces to functionalism.
It’s been fun my friend…….
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This gives me an opportunity to rewrite #4 since I mangled it slightly when I originally wrote it.
4- There is no evidence of a field or mystery coherence that could tightly unify consciousness that is fragmented. The size of brain, its biological nature, and its anatomical features makes it unlikely there could be a unitary consciousness.
A key word is “tightly” as in the phrase “tightly unified.” I may sound slightly like an illusionist here, but there is no guarantee that a perception of a tightly unified consciousness is correct. For that matter, with introspection, I’m not totally sure it is impossible to feel the fragmented components of experience if you try to look for them.
Actually quantum mind is somewhat a form of dualism, isn’t it? And it is illusive as the soul, so I can see how you are attracted to the idea.
“The reductionist approach that mind is simply what the brain does, not matter what schema is devised to support this premise reduces to functionalism”.
Not sure that was meant for me but I fail to see anything reductionist or functionalist in my approach. Keep in mind I haven’t ruled anything out as far as actual mechanism, not even quantum consciousnesses. I think the problem is this fragmented view pops your Kantian mind-bubble as well as goes against long standing talking points in philosophy about unified consciousness.
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If one is determined to work within the framework of materialism, then a quantum mind is not a form of dualism, not in the traditional sense anyway.
I don’t think that introspection being unreliable is the problem per se as much as it is the inability to reason correctly. I’ve got to hand it to you, because you’ve got a pretty good head on your shoulders my friend.
Until next time…….
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